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Abstract
We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their
preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all
values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting,
only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. Hence, the outcome will
be determined by voters with higher valuations. We show that in such a case welfare may be
enhanced. Such an e¤ect occurs when there is both a large enough density of voters with low
values and a high enough expected value.
JEL codes: C70, D72.
Keywords: costly voting, externalities.
1 Introduction
"The object of our deliberations is to promote the good purposes for which elections
have been instituted, and to prevent their inconveniences." (Edmund Burke as cited in
Lakeman and Lambert, 1959, p. 19)
Groups within society often have to make collective decisions. In order to reach correct social
decisions, the valuations of all those a¤ected by the decision should be aggregated. Leaving some
out may reach an incorrect decision. For example, take a committee that must decide upon an
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issue at a meeting. Each member has a certain private value to the results of the decision reached
by the committee. The committees social value of the decision is the sum of the individual private
values. In order to reach the correct outcome for the committee, the private values of all members
should be aggregated. A common method to reach a decision is to have a vote and one may think
that voting properly aggregates information. Since each member of the committee has information
that is relevant to the decision, we would normally think that ensuring all participate in voting
would improve the nal outcome. In fact, many countries (including Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
and Greece) have compulsory voting to ensure inclusion.1 There is, however, signicant di¤erence
between aggregating private values and ensuring full participation of all voters.
In social valuation, the strength of preference counts. In voting, the options for expressing
preference for any particular alternative are limited to either voting for it, or not voting for it (that
is, vote for an alternative or abstain).2 This means with voting it is not possible to demonstrate
intensity of preferences. One voter mildly in favor of an alternative exactly o¤sets another voter
who is strongly opposed.
These observations suggest that there may be gains, in avoiding poor decisions, by ensuring
that voters who have only mild feelings about the alternatives are excluded. In some sense, if their
vote counts for more than their strength of feeling then they may change the voting outcome in
a detrimental way. Indeed, in Australia where voting is mandatory, donkey votes (those that
simply were cast by order of a ballot) give a 1% edge to those listed rst (see Orr, 2002, and
King and Leigh, 2009). One way to exclude such voters is to ensure that there is a cost to voting
that deters participation by those without strong preferences (or are not well informed) and hence
achieve a socially-better outcome. This intuition is contrary to the widely held view that costly
voting is detrimental since it deters voting (and is a cost to those that do vote) leading to a paradox
of why people vote (see Dhillon and Peralta, 2002, for an overview).
Let us look at a simple model that captures the main intuition of our paper. There are two
options, A and B, and two voters: one prefers A and the other prefers B. There is an 1=2 chance
that a voter has utility of 1 for his preferred option (and  1 for the other) and 1=2 chance of utility
1Enforcement ranges from nes (Australia) to disenfranchisement (Belgium) or making it di¢ cult to obtain a
passport or drivers license (see Frankal, 2005).
2Among the rare exceptions are reality TV shows such as Pop Idol where individuals can vote more than once
(and pay for each vote).
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of 3 for his preferred option (and  3 for other). If the cost of voting is 0, everyone votes and the
social surplus is 0 (ties are broken randomly). If the cost of voting is c and only those with a high
value will vote, then there is positive social surplus from the option when only one voter has a
higher value and the other the lower value. This yields a gain of 3   1 = 2 and occurs 1=2 the
time. So the net social benets of voting is 1   c (each voter votes half the time). Thus, as long
as this is an equilibrium and c < 1, then costly voting can be socially benecial. This is indeed an
equilibrium if both voters nd it in their individual interests to vote only with a high value. To
see if this is true, a voter by voting improves the chance of his preferred option winning by 1=2 no
matter what the other voter chooses to do (since by voting one either goes from a tie to a win or
losing to a tie). Hence, if one has a private value to an option of v, one votes if v=2 > c: Thus, for
this to be an equilibrium we must have 3=2  c  1=2 (only the high-value voter should vote).
In this toy model, we compare two situations, one with costly voting and one with free voting,
and nd that, in fact, costly voting is superior. Hence, adding a cost to voting can be welfare
enhancing. This captures the intuition behind this phenomena, namely, with costly voting, only
those with high enough values would choose to incur the cost to voting, while with free voting, all
values are counted equally regardless of how valuable they may be.
Notice that there are two important components of this model that enable costly voting to be
superior to free voting. First, the high value is large enough. If instead of 3, the value were 2, then
costly voting would be inferior. (Gains from one voter having a high value and one a low value
would be 1 occurring 1=2 the time. This yields a net social gain of 1=2 c: Since c  1=2, the social
gain cannot be positive.) Second, the probability of having a low value should be su¢ ciently large
as well. For instance, if instead of 1/2 this was 1/4, then again costly voting would be inferior.3
In this paper, we investigate the above phenomenon in two directions. First, we allow for each
voter to have preferences over either option. In this initial model, we have discrete, privately-known
preferences over both options. Here we nd the distribution over values that yield superior costly
voting. Again, there must be a su¢ cient chance that a voter has a low valuation for this superiority.
We show this on a probability simplex. We follow this initial model with one that has a continuous
range of values. This allows us to explore the case with a large number of voters more easily.
Again, we show that increasing costs may be benecial and in addition we determine the optimal
3More generally, if p is the probability of having a low value and v is the high value, then there is a net gain to
voting if (v   1)p  c. This would be an equilibrium if v=2  c  1=2.
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cost c. Similar to our toy model, we nd that whether costly voting is superior depends upon both
the expected value and the density of lower value voters. We also show that in such a model a
government would never want to have mandatory voting by imposing nes or subsidizing voting
but may wish to implement a poll tax (a charge for voting).
This analysis can be seen as the normative counterpart to the positive analyses of Bulkley et al.
(2001) and Osborne et al. (2000). These papers establish that when voting is costly the outcome of
the voting game will have an equilibrium in which only voters from the extremes will participate.
Again, at rst sight it might appear that this is a bad outcome since it excludes moderate opinion.
What we show is that instead it can be e¢ cient to have precisely such an equilibrium.
More recently, Börgers (2004) has a model that shows that an equilibrium with costly voting
is superior to both mandatory voting (still with voting costs) and random selection of a winner
(with no voting). In the Börgers model, there is uncertainty for which alternative a voter prefers,
but no di¤erence in intensity of preference for a particular alternative. Thus, mandatory voting
has the benet of including all the available information (everyone votes) and selecting the best
alternative, but at the highest cost. Random selection has the lowest cost but uses no information.
Voluntary voting is the superior tradeo¤ where only those with low costs of voting vote. Krasa
and Polborn (2009) vary the Börgers model by allowing for ex-ante asymmetry of preferences over
alternatives. They nd that for a large enough number of voters, it is optimal to move towards
mandatory voting from voluntary voting (by a penalty for not voting or a subsidy to voting).
In our paper, we add intensity on preferences over alternatives. Now in contrast to the Börgers
model (and Krasa and Polborn), everyone voting no longer includes all information (it neglects
intensity of preference) and thus sometimes does not select the best alternative. We nd that even
if we eliminate all costs to mandatory voting by setting the cost of voting to zero, it may not
necessarily be superior. In fact, we nd that the social planner should in addition to eliminating
any penalties for not voting (as Börgers nds) the planner may in fact wish to increase the cost of
voting even if this cost is completely wasteful.
While less related, the Condorcet Jury literature models voting by a group of individuals with
a common value over two alternatives. Krishna and Morgan (2008) show that as the cost of voting
goes to zero, voluntary voting is the optimal mechanism. Ghoshal and Lockwood (2009) have
combined the common value in the Condercet Jury literature with the private value of alternatives
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in Börgers (2004). They nd that if the voters put a high weight on personal preferences then there
is an ine¢ cient high turnout for voting and in the case voters care more about the common aspect
then voter turnout is to low compared to the e¢ cient outcome.4
In the next section we examine the discrete model. Then in section 3, we analyze the continuous
model. We conclude in section 4.
2 Discrete Model
2.1 Description
There are n risk-neutral voters, who must choose between two options, A and B. The private value
that voter i obtains from the outcome of the voting process is vi if option B wins,  vi if option A
wins, and 0 if there is a tie and neither A nor B is implemented.5 It is assumed that the distribution
of vi is over K = f K; : : : ; 2; 1; 0; 1; 2; : : : ;Kg. For all k 2 K , the probability that vi = k is pk
where
X
k2K
pk = 1:
Each voter i chooses action i from three possibilities: fa; 0; bg; where 0 indicates not voting,
a indicates voting for A, and b indicates voting for B. All voters have the same cost of voting,
c  0: A pure strategy, si; for each voter is a choice of action for each possible private value,
si : vi ! fa; 0; bg. Denote Si as the set of possible strategies si.
An outcome for the voting process is from W = fA; ;; Bg, where ; denotes a tie. The outcome
of the voting process is determined by the function w(1; : : : ; n) on the actions of the voters.
Denote #fi : i = xg as the number of voters who choosing a particular action x 2 fa; 0; bg. The
winner is determined by the majority, hence w() = A if #fi : i = ag > #fi : i = bg; w() = B
if #fi : i = ag < #fi : i = bg; and w() = ; if #fi : i = ag = #fi : i = bg:
Given outcome function w, the utility for voter i, ui(s1; : : : ; sn; vi) is given by
ui(s1; : : : ; sn; vi) =
8>>><>>>:
vi   c if w(s1(vi); : : : ; sn(vi)) = B and si(vi) 2 fa; bg
 vi   c if w(s1(vi); : : : ; sn(vi)) = A and si(vi) 2 fa; bg
 c if w(s1(vi); : : : ; sn(vi)) = ; and si(vi) 2 fa; bg
4The equivalent of costly voting has also been addressed in the Condorcet Jury literature by allowing voters to
buy costly signals about the common feature of the alternatives (see Persico, 2004, Gerardi and Yariv, 2005).
5Equivalently, if there is a tie, A or B is chosen randomly.
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ui(s1; : : : ; sn; vi) =
8>>><>>>:
vi if w(s1(vi); : : : ; sn(vi)) = B and si(vi) = 0
 vi if w(s1(vi); : : : ; sn(vi)) = A and si(vi) = 0
0 if w(s1(vi); : : : ; sn(vi)) = ; and si(vi) = 0
2.2 Equilibrium and results
Each voter i chooses a mixed-strategy i over the possible pure strategies, i 2 Si: Denote  as
(1; : : : ; n) and i() as the expected utility of i over values and strategies. Using this notation,
we now dene the equilibrium of the voting game.
Denition 1 A vector of strategies b forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if for all voters i, given
the strategies of the other voters fb ig, we have i(bi; b i)  i(i; b i); for all i 2 Si:
Denition 2 The expected social surplus in equilibrium b is Pni=1 i(b):
In order to further analyze the equilibrium, we need to determine when a voter chooses to vote.
In the following lemma, we describe the condition when the gains from voting exceeds the cost of
voting.
Lemma 1 Strategy bsi(vi) = a can be part of equilibrium b only if24 P (#fi : s i(vi) = ag = #fi : s i(vi) = bgjb; vi)+
P (#fi : s i(vi) = ag = #fi : s i(vi) = bg   1)jb; vi)
35 vi
2
 c
where P (jb) is the probability of an event occurring in the equilibrium b. Strategy bsi(vi) = b can
be part of equilibrium b only if
24 P (#fi : s i(vi) = ag = #fi : s i(vi) = bgjb; vi)+
P (#fi : s i(vi) = ag   1 = #fi : s i(vi) = bg)jb; vi)
35 vi
2
 c:
Likewise, strategy bsi(vi) = 0 can be part of equilibrium b only if24 P (#fi : s i(vi) = ag = #fi : s i(vi) = bgjb; vi)+
P (#fi : s i(vi) = ag = #fi : s i(vi) = bg   1)jb; vi)
35 vi
2
 c
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and 24 P (#fi : s i(vi) = ag = #fi : s i(vi) = bgjb; vi)+
P (#fi : s i(vi) = ag   1 = #fi : s i(vi) = bg)jb; vi)
35 vi
2
 c:
Lemma 1 explains that one votes if the probability of one being pivotal multiplied by the gains
from voting if one is pivotal is greater than the cost of voting. The probability of being pivotal
consists of two parts, rst, that the voting is tied without the voter, and second, the voting is
tied including the voter. Note that the benet from voting when one is pivotal is vi=2 because if
there is a tie, there is a fty-percent chance of winning and hence from moving from losing to a tie
increases the likelihood of winning by fty percent (and moving from a tie to winning also increases
the likelihood by fty percent).
Lemma 2 If bsi(vi) = a is part of equilibrium b; then for all evi 2 K such that evi > vi; bsi(evi) = a
is part of equilibrium b; while bsi(evi) = b and bsi(evi) = 0 are not part of equilibrium b: Likewise,
if bsi(vi) = b is part of equilibrium b; then for all evi 2 K such that evi > vi; bsi(evi) = b is part of
equilibrium b; while bsi(evi) = a and bsi(evi) = 0 are not part of equilibrium b:
It is clear that with donkey votes, increasing c from 0 to " will increase the social surplus,6 but
it is not obvious that there is a benet to increasing c beyond ". In the following proposition, we
that this may indeed be the case.
Proposition 1 The social surplus can be increasing in c for c > 0.
Proof. To show this, we will examine two examples in a symmetric environment where n = 3,
K = m  2, pi = p i, and pj = p j = 0 for all m > j > 1: Let us rst look at the case there is a
small cost.
Low cost equilibrium:
For small enough c, there is a unique equilibrium where everyone always votes for their preferred
choice and those with value 0 do not vote. This can only be an equilibrium if it is worthwhile for
a voter with value 1 or  1 to vote. From Lemma 1, this happens if for the voter, the expected
gains of being pivotal is strictly greater than the cost, which implies 2(p1+ pm)2(1=2) + (1  2p1 
6For example, if p0 > 1=2 and c = 0, all those with value 0 vote for A, then for large enough n the outcome will
be A. This would be regardless of the valuations. If p1 = 1  p0; then it would be e¢ cient for B to win. Hence, there
would be a social improvement by increasing c to ":
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2pm)
2(1=2) + 2(p1 + pm)(1   2p1   2pm)(1=2) = (p1 + pm)2 + (1   2p1   2pm)=2 > c: Note from
Lemma 2, we need only check this one condition (and not an additional condition for a voter with
absolute value of 2). Hence, if c is small enough each voter will vote for all vi  1.
We now proceed to compute the expected voter surplus of such an equilibrium. The possible
states ex ante are (i) all three voters vote for the same option, (ii) two voters vote for the same option
and the third votes for the other, (iii) one voter is indi¤erent and the other two prefer opposing
options, (iv) one voter is indi¤erent and the other two voters prefer the same option, (v) two voters
are indi¤erent and the third votes for his preferred option (vi) all three are indi¤erent. Therefore,
we can compute the probability and the expected value of all the possible six states: (i) there is a
2(p1+pm)
3 chance that all three voters vote for the same option. In this case, the expected surplus
is 3E[vijvi > 0]   3c = 3p1+mpmp1+pm   3c. (ii) There is a 6(p1 + pm)3 chance that two voters vote for
the same option and the other voter votes for the other option. In this case, the expected surplus is
E[vijvi > 0] 3c = p1+mpmp1+pm  3c: (iii) There is a 6(p1+pm)2(1 2p1 2pm) chance that one voter is
indi¤erent and the other two vote for opposing options. In this case, the expected surplus is  2c.
(iv) There is a 6(p1+ pm)2(1  2p1  2pm) chance that two voters vote for the same option and one
is undecided. In this case, the expected surplus is 2E[vijvi > 0]  2c = 2p1+mpmp1+pm   2c: (v) There is
a 6(p1 + pm)(1  2p1   2pm)2 chance that two are undecided. In this case the expected surplus is
E[vijvi > 0]  c = p1+mpmp1+pm   c: (vi) When all are indi¤erent, there is zero expected surplus.
Overall, the ex-ante surplus in the low equilibrium is
SSL(c) = 6(p1 +mpm)(1 + 2p
2
1   2(1  pm)pm   2p1(1  2pm))  6(p1 + pm)c:
High cost equilibrium:
In this equilibrium, when the cost of voting, c; is high, voters with value 1 or  1 will choose 0
(not vote) and only voters with values m and  m will choose their respective option. The voter
with absolute value m will vote if (1 2pm)2 m (1=2)+2 pm (1 2pm) m (1=2)+p2m m (1=2) > c
or (m=2) (1  pm)2 > c: Also, the voter with absolute value 1 will not vote if his expected utility is
smaller than the cost, that is, (1  2pm)2  1  (1=2) + 2  pm  (1  2pm)  1  (1=2) + p2m  1  (1=2) < c
or (1   pm)2=2 < c: Given that only the high-value voter, j vi j= 2; will vote; (i) there is a
(2pm)
3 chance that all three voters have a value of 2 or  2. In such a case, the expected value
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is (1=4)  3  2 + (3=4)  2   3c = 3   3c: (ii) There is a 3 (2pm)2 (1   2pm) chance that two voters
have values of 2 or  2. In such a case, there is only a benet if both have the same sign. So the
expected value in that case is (1=2)  4  2c = 2  2c: (iii) There is a 3(2pm)(1  2pm)2 chance that
only one voter has a value of 2 or  2. In such a case, the benet is 2  c. So the total surplus is
SSH(c) = 6m  pm(1  2(1  pm)pm)  6pmc:
Comparison:
We can now compare free voting to costly voting in our example. If (m=2) (1   pm)2 > c >
(1  pm)2=2, then it is an equilibrium for only voters with high values of m to vote. If in this case,
SSH(c) > SSL(0), then indeed costly voting is superior. Take for example m = 10 and c = 1=2.
These parameters satisfy the equilibrium constraints (m=2) (1   pm)2  c  (1   pm)2=2 for all
pm 2 (0; 0:6838): In Figure 1, we plotted the range of probabilities for which SSH(c) > SSL(0):
Notice that p1 or pm should not be too high or too low, while p0 can be zero, but not too high.
If pm is too high, it simply means that there is a low probability of having values of 0, 1 or  1.
This means that there is not much to be gained by excluding these voters compared with the cost.
If pm is too low, then by excluding voters with values of 1 or  1, one would be excluding a large
amount of information and doing so is not worthwhile.
P0 P1
Pm
Figure 1: The probability simplex where probability is equal to the shortest distance to the side
opposite the vertex. The shaded region is where costly voting is superior to free voting. This is
for c = 0:5 and m = 10. (Note P1 = p1 + p 1, Pm = pm + p m and P0 = p0.)
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The optimal c in our example is either c = (1  pm)2=2 or c = 0. This depends whether or not
SSH( (1 pm)
2
2 ) > SSL(0). This is because if c chosen to induce only the voters with values of m or
 m to vote, then c satises (m=2) (1   pm)2  c  (1   pm)2=2. However, it is only these voters
that voter for any c that satises those constraints. Since the voters that vote must expend c to
vote. Subject to the constraints, this wasteful expense is minimized at c = (1  pm)2=2:
3 Continuous model
3.1 Description
We now move to framework with a continuous range of values. This allows us to more e¤ectively
analyze a large number of voters, determine an optimal level of the cost of voting and determine
which distributions lead to a strictly positive optimal cost. Unlike the discrete model (and like our
toy model), we keep the number of voters preferring a particular option xed and we vary only their
preferences for how much they prefer that particular option. Here our model more appropriately
represents a committee making a binary decision. For instance, a committee must decide where to
build a casino. The casino will be built in either district A or district B. There is a representative
for district A who values it being built in A as va > 0 (and being built in B at 0). There is a
representative for district B who values it being built in B as vb > 0 (and being built in A at 0).
Each representatives value is private information.
If both (or neither) show up to the meeting, there is a 50% chance of either district being
selected. If one shows up, then that representatives district wins. So, showing up improves the
chance of having ones district selected by 50%; however, there is a common cost of showing up
(cost of voting) which is c. This means representative i shows up if vi  2c:
More generally, assume that there are two types of voters and n voters of each type (overall
there are 2n voters). Assume that each voter i has value vi  0 is drawn from distribution F .
If 1  i  n; voter i is a type A voter who values a win by A at vi and a win by B at 0. If
n+1  i  2n; voter i is a type B voter who values a win by B at vi and a win by A at 0.7 Choice
7Note that A winning yields higher social surplus if
nX
i=1
vi 
2nX
i=n+1
vi: Rearranging terms yields
nX
i=1
vi
2
+
2nX
i=n+1
  vi
2

2nX
i=n+1
vi
2
+
nX
i=1
  vi
2
. Notice this is the condition for if the voter has utility vi
2
for his preferred candidate winning and
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A wins if the number of votes it receives, denoted by #A; is strictly greater the number of votes
choice B receives, denoted by #B. (We apologize for the change of notation from the previous
section.) Choice B wins #B > #A. There is a tie if #B = #A and the winner is determined
randomly with equal probability.
3.2 Equilibrium and results
Denote v(c) as a cuto¤ strategy such that a voter i votes if his value is above v(c) and doesnt
vote if his value is below v(c). We denote Pr i(eventjv) as the probability that event occurs
given that all voters except voter i follows cuto¤ strategy v(c) and voter i does not to vote.
A voter i where 1  i  n (a type A) and with value vi will vote if
Vi

1
2
Pr i(#A = #Bjv) + 1
2
Pr i(#A = #B   1jv)

> c:
The rst expression Pr i(#A = #Bjv) represents the case when the voter will change the vote
from a tie to a win by voting. The second expression Pr i(#A = #B   1jv) represents the case
when the voter will change the outcome of a vote from losing to a tie.
Lemma 3 A cuto¤ v(c) forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if
v
n 1X
i=0

n  1
i

n
i+ 1

F (v)2(n i 1) (1  F (v))2i [1 + iF (v)] = 2c: (1)
Proof. The cuto¤ will be such that the value for voting equals the cost.
v(c) 

1
2
Pr i(#A = #Bjv) + 1
2
Pr i(#A = #B   1jv)

= c:
  vi
2
for the other candidate winning. For simplicity, we frame the utility as only having a utility for ones preferred
candidate.
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When the voter i prefers A (i  n); we can rewrite the probabilities in this equation as follows:
Pr i(#A = #Bjv)
= Pr i(#A = #B = 0jv) + Pr i(#A = #B = 1jv) + :::+ Pr i(#A = #B = n  1jv)
=
n 1X
i=0

n  1
i

n
i

(1  F (v))2i+1 F (v)2(n i 1)
and
Pr i(#A = #B   1jv)
= Pr i(#A = 0;#B = 1jv) + Pr i(#A = 1;#B = 2jv) + :::+ Pr i(#A = n  1;#B = njv)
=
n 1X
i=0

n  1
i

n
i+ 1

(1  F (v))2i+1 F (v)2(n i 1) :
Substituting these expressions into the cuto¤ value equation yields:
v
n 1X
i=0

n  1
i

n
i

(1  F (v))2i F (v)2(n i) 1 +

n  1
i

n
i+ 1

(1  F (v))2i+1 F (v)2(n i 1)

= 2c:
This can be simplied as
v
n 1X
i=0

n  1
i

n
i+ 1

F (v)2(n i 1) (1  F (v))2i [1 + iF (v)] = 2c
The same equation holds for voters preferring B (i > n):
Lemma 4 When there is a zero cost of voting, everyone votes, v(0) = 0:
Proof. This follows directly from equation (1).
Lemma 5 If n = 1 or limv!0 vF 0(v) = 0; then limc!0 vc (c) = 2:
Proof. Equation (1) must hold for all c, so we can take the derivative w.r.t. c and take the limit
as c! 0. As c! 0; we have v ! 0 (from Lemma 4), so limv!0 (1  F ) = 1; limv!0 F = 0: Notice
that from this we need only worry about the term when i = n   1: (For n > 1, the rest vanish.)
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This yields: h
1  (n  1) lim
v!0
v  F 0(v)
i
=
2
vc (0)
:
Hence, vc (0) = 2 when n = 1 or limv!0 vF 0(v) = 0:
Example 1 When F (v) = v where  > 0; we have limv!0 vF 0(v) = limv!0 v = 0:
Lemma 6 The social surplus to voting is then the expected value of the winner minus the costs of
voting:
SSV (c) =
nX
a=0
nX
b=0

n
a

n
b

F (v(c))2n a b (1  F (v(c)))a+b
24 (n maxfa; bg)E[VijVi < v(c)]+
maxfa; bgE[VijVi > v(c)]
35(2)
 2(1  F (v(c)))n  c:
The expected value of the winner is computed by going through the possible number of voters
for each candidate where a is the votes for candidate A and b is the votes for candidate B. The
probability of each case is calculated and multiplied by the expected value of the voters that vote
for the winner. The expression 2n(1   F (v(c)))c is the expected cost of the voters voting since
(1  F (v(c))) is the probability of each voter voting.
In the following example, we can examine how the social surplus to voting depends upon c.
Example 2 F (v) = v on [0; 1], c < 1=2; n = 1.
From (1), v(c) = 2c: We can then write equation (2) as
(2c)2E[V jV < 2c] + (1  (2c)2)E[V jV > 2c]  2(1  (2c))c
=
  2c(1 + ) + (2c)(+ 2c)
1 + 
:
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Figure 2. The social surplus net of voting costs versus the cost of voting c when F (v) = v:5 and
n = 1.
If  = 0:5; the net surplus is plotted in Figure 2. As we see here, the ideal c is strictly positive.
It reaches a maximum at c = 0:0223291: We can also examine the probability density function of
v. This density is 0:5v :5 and shown in Figure 3:
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1
2
3
4
5
v
density
Figure 3. The graph of the density function of f(v) = 0:5v 0:5 and a vertical line at v = 2c at
c = :0223291 (the optimal c):
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In Figure 3, the voters to the left of the vertical line do not vote when c is at the optimal level.
We now ask if in our example, for which  is there a gain in surplus to increasing the cost of voting.
For n = 1, the slope of the surplus w.r.t. c is
SSV 0(c) =  2 + 2
c 1(2 + 2(1 + )c)
1 + 
:
For  > 1 ; limc!0 SSV 0(c) =  2: For  = 1; SSV 0(c) =  1: For 0 <  < 1; limc!0 SSV 0(c) =1:
Hence, when 0 <  < 1, the surplus improves by increasing the cost. It also turns out that for
  1, the surplus is at the highest when cost is zero. (When   1; SSV 0(c) is increasing in c,
hence SSV 0(c) can equal zero only once. Since SSV (0) = SSV (1=2), no one votes in either case,
and SSV 0(0) < 0, that point must be a minimum.) The following is a proposition that examines
the former possibility for general F .
Proposition 2 If limv!0 F 0(v)v = 0; limv!0 F 0(v)F (v) = 0 and E[v] F 0(0) > 1; then it is optimal
to have c > 0.
Proof. In this proof, we would like to show that limc!0 SSV 0(c) > 0: In order to show this, we wish
to show that the derivative of the expected value of the voters that prefer the winning candidate is
higher than the derivative of the expected costs. Let us rst examine the former.
Assuming limv!0 F 0(v)F (v) = 0, the derivative of this expected value as c goes to 0 can be
determined as follows. The probability of a voters voting for A and b voters voting for B is 
n
a
 
n
b

F (v(c))2n a b (1  F (v(c)))a+b : The limit of this term as c! 0 is zero unless a+ b = 2n.
The derivative of this term goes to zero as c! 0 unless a+b = 2n or a+b = 2n 1. Note that there is
one case when a+b = 2n and there are 2n cases when a+b = 2n 1. When a+b = 2n; the derivative
of F (v(c))2n a b (1  F (v(c)))a+b = (1  F (v(c)))2n goes to  2nF 0vc:When a+b = 2n 1; the
derivative of F (v(c))2n a b (1  F (v(c)))a+b = F (v(c)) (1  F (v(c)))2n 1 goes to F 0vc: When
a+b = n, we have (n maxfa; bg)E[VijVi < v(c)]+maxfa; bgE[VijVi > v(c)] = nE[VijVi > v(c)]:
When a+ b = 2n  1; we also have (n maxfa; bg)E[VijVi < v(c)] + maxfa; bgE[VijVi > v(c)] =
nE[VijVi > v(c)]: Thus,
lim
c!0
SSV 0(c) =
ndE[VijVi > v(c)]
dc
  2n+ lim
c!0
2F 0(v(c))n  2  c:
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Since E[V jV > v(c)] =
R1
v(c) vdF (v)
1 F (v(c)) ; we have
dE[V jV > v(c)]
dc
=
 vc (c)v(c)F 0(v(c))
(1  F (v(c)) +
F 0(v(c))vc (c)
R1
v(c) vdF (v)
(1  F (v(c))2 :
Hence, limc!0
dE[V jV >v(c)]
dc = 2F
0(v(c))
R1
0 vdF (v) = 2F
0(v(c))E[v]: Thus, if F 0(0)E[v] > 1;
SSV 0(0) > 0 and it is optimal to increase costs.
It is interesting that the condition that ensures that the surplus is increasing in cost has two
components that depend upon the distribution of v: the density at zero and the expected value.
The combination of these two components must be large enough. Too low a value of the density
at zero would mean that increasing cost does not eliminate enough low value votes. Too low
an expected value would mean that the benet to eliminating these low-value voters is not large
enough. An alternative condition is to replace 2F 0(0)E[v] by limc!0
dE[V jV >v(c)]
dc : This implies that
the expected value of those voting is increasing in cost by a su¢ cient amount, 2. In other words, if
one increases cost marginally by a dollar (at zero), then the expected value of those voting should
go up by 2 in order for costly voting to be benecial.
The condition F 0(0)E[v] > 1 is also equivalent to limv!0
dE[V jV >v]
dv > 1: This states that the
mean-residual-lifetime function (MRL) of F is strictly increasing at zero. It is satised by all strict
log-convexity distributions (see Proposition 2 of Heckman and Honore, 1990). Similar conditions
(such as having a monotone MRL) are used in a variety of economic applications (see Bagnoli and
Bergstrom, 2005). These include McAfee and Miller (2009) who show that an increasing MRL at
zero implies allocating objects/appointments by reservations is ine¢ cient for low transportation
costs.
3.3 What is the optimal level of voting?
We saw in the previous section that voting, even if it is costly, can have benets to social surplus.
However, in the previous section, who voted was determined by equilibrium conditions. In this
section, we wish to ask what should be the correct level of voting for society. This is the equivalent
of asking what is the critical level of value above which people should vote. Once this level is
found, then it can be induced by either having penalties for not voting or adding a poll tax. These
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penalties and taxes are just transfers and thus do not a¤ect overall welfare.8
Let us rst examine this problem in example 2. The social surplus in equation (2) becomes
(v)2E[V jV < v] + (1  (v)2)E[V jV > v]  2(1  (v))c =
1
1 + 
(  2c  2c+ v(+ 2c+ 2c  v)) :
From the rst-order condition, the optimal cuto¤ v = 2c + 1+ while in equilibrium v
 = 2c.
Thus, there is overvoting in the voting equilibrium. Hence, in our environment one would never
want to impose a ne for not voting, but instead try to induce people to not vote.
Another interpretation is that in equilibrium one votes when v  2c: However, this is not taking
into the externality imposed upon the other voter (if you win, then the other voter loses). The
other voters expected value is E[v] and the probability of him winning goes down by 1=2 if you
vote. Hence, e¢ ciency dictates that one should vote only if 12 (v   E[v])  c or v  2c+E[v]: (Note
that E[v] = 1+ :) We generalize this intuition in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If there are n voters of each type with symmetric distributions of values, then (i)
there is overvoting (ii) there should be no nes to encourage voting (no mandatory voting) (iii)
there should be a poll tax to discourage voting.
Proof. A voters vote will be pivotal in two instances. Case (A): when there is a tie in votes
without his vote. Case (B): when the other candidate leads by 1 without his vote. In case (A),
say there are m voters that vote for each candidate. Hence, there will be m voters that favor his
candidate with values above the cuto¤ v and n 1 m voters that favor his candidate with values
below the cuto¤. Also, there will be m voters that favor the other candidate with values above
the cuto¤ and n  m voters that favor the other candidate with values below the cuto¤. The net
di¤erence is one voter that prefers the other candidate with a value below the cuto¤. Thus, in
case (A), the externality imposed by a voter on others by voting is E[vjv < v] (where v is the
8Another method would be to employ some criteria for voting that reects values. For instance, Je¤erson felt
only the educated should vote (Padover 1952, page 43). In our model, they would have better information and hence
higher values for certain candidates. There have also been literacy and property ownership as requirements. While
literacy might have been used to disenfranchise certain minority groups, a property ownership requirement for the
most part was to restrict voting to groups that had a stake in the country (high values).
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cuto¤ used by others):We can do a similar calculation for case (B). There, the externality imposed
by a voter on others by voting is E[vjv > v]: In either case, this externality is negative and a
voter doesnt take this into account. Thus, there should be less voting. Formalizing this logic, the
optimal cuto¤ should then solve:
n 1X
i=0
24  n 1i  ni (1  F (v))2i F (v)2(n i) 1 (v   E[vjv < v])+ 
n 1
i
 
n
i+1

(1  F (v))2i+1 F (v)2(n i 1) (v   E[vjv > v])
35 = 2c: (3)
From this equation, the equilibrium cuto¤ will then be lower than the optimal cuto¤ (the LHS will
be smaller than 2c for all v less than the equilibrium cuto¤). Since the optimal level of voting is
lower than the equilibrium level. It is optimal for a government to charge for voting in order to
implement the optimal cuto¤. This would be change the c in equation (1) such that the v that
solves that equation (1) matches the solution to the equation (3).
Börgers (2004) has a model that shows that an equilibrium with costly voting is superior to
both mandatory voting (still with voting costs). Our result in this section, agrees with that result
but in our framework. The main di¤erence in our continuous model is that we allow for di¤erent
intensities of preferences. Because of this di¤erence, we see that it is always optimal to charge a
poll tax. This includes the case when there is no cost to voting when in fact in the Börgers model
such free voting yields the optimal allocation. In our model, such free voting never does and it is
optimal to charge a poll tax.
It is not clear that a poll tax is politically viable. This then leads to our previous section where
it may be worthwhile to maintain a cost of voting. Doing so eliminates voters with little intensity
for their preferred candidate.
4 Conclusion
Since the nineteenth century, political scientists have been in agreement that increasing the franchise
will be benecial to the society (Lakeman and Lambert, 1959, page 19). So over the last century
in democracies, the right to vote has been given to most of the adult society and the requirements
of registration to vote such as property qualications have been removed. Social scientists have
further asked the question whether or not it makes sense to require people to vote. In addition
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this requirement to vote also gets around the paradox that since each individual may nd his vote
negligible will choose not to vote if there is a cost to voting. We show that not only should one not
require people to vote but there is a distinct benet to having some people not vote and increasing
the (wasteful) cost to voting may paradoxically be benecial to society. (Note increasing a wasteful
cost of voting may be politically more viable than imposing a poll tax.) For instance, if a committee
has an important vote, scheduling the meeting at an inconvenient time may improve the outcome.
This also shows that allowing absentee ballots or internet voting can be damaging.9
Since this is the rst paper to show that increasing the cost to voting can be benecial, there
are many directions of future research where one can expand the result. One direction is to increase
the number of alternatives on the ballot to more than two. With committee voting this seems quite
logical. Furthermore, once this is done, one can introduce approval voting to ameliorate strategic
voting (see Brams and Fishburn, 1978).
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